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ABSTRACT 
 
We explore dynamic linkages between financial/banking sector openness, 
financial sector competition, and growth. We first develop an analytical model, 
highlighting links between long-run economic performance and services trade, 
through scale economies and market and cost structures in the financial services 
sector.  This is followed by an econometric exercise based on data for 130 
countries for the 1990s.  Our results point to a strong positive relationship 
between financial sector competition/performance and financial sector openness 
(meaning foreign bank access to domestic markets), and between growth and 
financial sector competition/performance.  They also point to the presence of 
scale economies in the sector. 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
This paper explores issues that straddle two different literatures.  First, they relate 
directly to the nascent literature on trade in services, and to the impact of services trade, 
in terms of foreign bank/institutional participation in domestic capital markets, on 
economic performance. Second, they are also closely related, though not identical, to 
those issues found in the strand of the finance and growth literature involving capital 
market liberalization and financial flows restrictions. The mechanisms we highlight are 
linked to the pro-competitive effects of openness, and come on top of those emphasized 
in the current literature on financial sector development. 
 
Our approach involves a mix of theory and empirics.  We first formalize linkages 
between banking/financial sector competition, scale, openness, and growth.  These 
analytics motivate an empirical exercise, based on a sample of 130 countries that covers 
their experience in the 1990s.  These date include standard cross-country growth 
indicators (macroeconomic stability, inflation, etc.), along with finance sector 
indicators (financial openness, banking concentration, etc.). In cross-country 
regressions on data for 130 countries in the 1990s, we find that there is a strong positive 
relationship between financial sector competition and financial sector openness, and 
between growth and financial sector competition.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the early neoclassical growth literature, financial services played a passive role, 
simply funneling household savings to investors. Goldsmith [1969] and McKinnon 
[1973] were among the first to make a break from this mold, emphasizing a more 
active role for financial services in promoting growth.  Since then, a considerable 
theoretical and empirical literature has emerged analyzing the role of finance in 
growth and development.  
This paper explores issues that straddle two different literatures.  First, they 
relate directly to the nascent literature on trade in services, and to the impact of 
services trade, in terms of foreign bank/institutional participation in domestic capital 
markets, on economic performance.1 Second, they are also closely related, though not 
identical, to those issues found in the strand of the finance and growth literature 
involving capital market liberalization and financial flows restrictions.2  The 
mechanisms we highlight are linked to the pro-competitive effects of openness, and 
                                                                 
1 Traditionally, the formal trade literature has focused on trade in goods, with  the literature on services 
trade being a relatively limited and recent addition.  While there is a sizable empirical literature on 
service sector policy and deregulation, this is largely focused on domestic deregulation.  A thorough 
overview is provided by WTO 1998).   
2 See the survey of Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (forthcoming).  
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come on top of those emphasized in the current literature on financial sector 
development. 
The recent empirical literature emphasizes two ways in which financial 
services affect growth -- capital accumulation and technical innovation.  Gains in 
these areas can result either in temporarily higher growth rates (transitional or 
bounded growth effects) or in permanently higher growth rates. In general, the 
approach involves employing financial sector development indicators as independent 
variables in growth regressions.  Most of this literature has looked at (i.) indicators of 
banking sector development, and the degree of private sector involvement in financ ial 
services and the allocation of savings, and (ii.) distortion and financial service cost 
measures.  In addition, a few studies have examined the relationship between stock-
market development and growth.  No real emphasis is placed on the role of traded 
financial services.  By this, we mean focus on identification of a possible causal chain 
linking financial sector openness, financial sector performance, and growth 
performance. 
 DeGregorio and Guidotti [1995] report a significant link between private 
sector credit and economic growth, while Demetriades and Hussein [1996] and Jung 
[1986] find that financial sector development/depth and growth have a bi-directional 
relationship.  Roubini and Sala-i-Martin [1992] and Mattesini [1996] both report a 
negative relationship between real interest rate distortions and lending-deposit spreads 
and growth.  Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel (2001, 5 countries using time-series 
techniques) find only weak evidence for the hypothesis that stock market activity 
accelaretes growth. The empirical results of the latter attribute more weight to the role 
of banks in promoting growth.   
 While the empirical literature has moved us from assumptions of a passive 
financial intermediation mechanism to explicit linkages between intermediation and 
growth, the role of open markets in general, and financial sector openness (in a trade 
sense) in particular, has not been emphasized.  However, one step in this direction is 
recent work linking openness with financial development and performance. For 
example, Claessens and Glaessner [1998] have shown that barriers to financial 
services trade have slowed down the development of financial markets in East Asia. 
while Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga [1998] have shown that greater 
foreign presence reduces profit margins for domestic banks in developing country 
financial sectors.  In our view, this suggests the first link in the causal chain explored 
here between financial sector openness, financial sector performance, and economic 
growth.   
Our approach here involves a mix of theory and empirics, and is organized as 
follows. First, in Section II we develop a model that highlights linkages between 
banking/financial sector competition, scale, openness, and growth. This motivates our 
empirical exercise in Section III, which is based on a sample of 130 countries, 
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covering their experience in the 1990s.  These date include standard cross-country 
growth indicators (macroeconomic stability, inflation, etc.), along with finance sector 
indicators (financial openness, banking concentration, etc.).  We find strong evidence 
for a link between financial sector openness, competition in local financial service 
markets, and economic growth.  We summarize in Section IV. 
 
II. THEORY 
A. Basic Structure 
We start by exploring linkages between competition, openness and growth 
analytically.  This helps to motivate the empirical exercise offered in the next section. 
We are primarily concerned with the location of finance firms at the nexus of the 
savings and investment mechanism, and the implications of services trade and 
competition for the working of this mechanism.   
We first assume that the national GDP function is Cobb-Douglas. 
  
Q = AKaL1-a  
 
(1) 
 
In equation (1), Q is GDP, K is production capital, L is labor and 0<a<1.  The 
composite Q also serves as the numeraire good.  We assume a Ramsey-type long-run 
macroeconomic closure, with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences 
defined over consumption of the composite good Q and with consumers engaged in 
intertemporal optmization.  This means the model has certain well-known properties.  
In particular, consumers strike a balance between present and deferred consumption, 
yielding the following modified version of the well-known steady-state condition in 
equation (2). 
  
fdr ++=r  
 
(2) 
 
In equation (2), r is the return earned by capital in the steady-state, r is the subjective 
rate of time discount, d is the rate of capital stock depreciation, and f is the cost of 
financial intermediation (i.e. the payment made in units of numeraire Q as discussed 
below).   
 The critical assumption at this juncture is that financial service firms provide a 
necessary bridge between savings (i.e. the creation of financial capital) and actual 
investment (the creation of physical capital available for investment expenditures).  
The theoretical literature on financial intermediation is extensive, and offers 
numerous alternative explanations for the observation of intermediation activities.3  
All that we require here is that in the reduced form financial intermediation involves a 
                                                                 
3 Examples include Diamond (1984,1991), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Williamson (1987a, 1987b). 
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real resource cost that drives a wedge between the gross returns earned by physical 
capital and the net returns realized by financial capital owners. 
To facilitate simplification of the analytics we employ several normalizations.  
These follow from the following assumption.  While we have assumed a concave 
aggregate production technology in terms of K and L, we also assume Ricardian (i.e. 
linear) transform technology between the composite Q and each of its alternative uses 
as (i.) consumption good C, (ii.) investment good (physical capital) K and (iii) 
financial services F.  Hence we define units so that one unit of Q yields one unit of C  
or K, and we assume that financial intermediation activities are also scaled so that one 
unit of financial services (at price f) is required per physical capital unit per period.  
The resource cost and pricing of financial services is discussed below. 
The market for Q is competitive, as are factor markets.  Capital and Labor both earn 
their value of marginal product measured in units of the numeraire Q.  Hence, from 
the first order conditions, we will have r = aQ /K .  Combining this with the steady-
state condition in equation [2] allows us to derive the following steady-state values 
(for a given price of financial services):   
  
LS
LK
LAQ
a
a
aa
d -
-
-
Y=
Y=
Y=
1/1
1/1
1/
*
*
*
 
 
 
(3) 
 
 
In equations (3) a * denotes a steady-state value while )/( fdra ++=Y A  and S 
denotes the level of financial savings.   
To close the system we specify the competitive structure of financial markets 
so that f is determined along with the other variables in equation (3).  To do this we 
assume a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the financial services sector, with constant 
marginal cost in the financial services sector (measured in units of Q) represented by 
b.  There are n financial service firms.  For now, assume that the value of n is simply 
set directly by regulatory authorities.  These firms set quantities strategically in the 
sense that they are engaged in a game where they exercise market power by limiting 
the level of services supplied (or identically they strategically set the size of the 
investment basket they are willing to service).  We adopt the classic Cournot 
assumption.  Each firm believes that other firms will not adjust quantities when it 
does.    
What does equilibrium look like in the region of the steady-state?  From 
equations (3), we can derive the demand elasticity for financial services in the region 
of the steady-state: 
  
e* = -
f
1- a
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
[r + d + f]-1 < 0 
 
(4) 
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The Nash equilibrium conditions combined with equation [4] then give us the 
following relationship between n and f in the region of the steady-state.   
  
f* = -
-bn - (1- a)r - (1- a)d
n - (1- a)
 
 
(5) 
 
  
where ¶f *¶n =
b
n - (1 - a)
+
-bn - (1 - a)r - (1 - a)d
n - (1 - a )
 < 0 since 
b(n - (1 - a))
(n - (1 - a))2
<
bn
(n - (1 - a))2
.  
Entry implies lower prices, and hence through equation (2) higher steady-state capital 
stocks, with related implications for the transition path from one steady-state to 
another.  Directly lowering prices through trade will have similar effects, as would 
entry of foreign banks into a domestic oligopoly.  We explore these issues in the next 
subsection. 
Making a substitution into equation (3) yields the steady-state per-capita 
capital stock.  
 
k* =
n r + d + b( )
aA(n - (1- a))
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
1
-(1-a )
 
 
(6) 
 
So far we have assumed the number of firms is set endogenously. To close the 
system, we are now going to add conditions sufficient to determine the number of 
firms n.   In formal terms, we specify a limit entry condition.  If unit profits are below 
a critical leve l p , firms exit, and if they are above this level, we have entry.  The 
critical level could, for example, represent a regulatory target for long-term financial 
institution health.  (It could also, of course, be zero).  With symmetry across banks we 
then have: 
  
f*= p +
cn
Lk*
+ b 
 
(7) 
 
 
where c represents fixed costs (if any) and b again represents marginal costs.  
Together, equations (5), (6), and (7) are sufficient to define f, n, and k in the region of 
the steady-state. 
 
B. Trade and Market Size 
There are several ways in which trade may affect long-run capital stocks (and hence 
transitional and long-run economic performance) in our analytical framework.  The 
simplest approach is to assume a small country, with directly imported financial 
services setting a maximum price in the domestic market.  Regulation and related 
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trade barriers can be assumed to influence the import price, and hence the domestic 
price level, directly.  From equation (3), we then have: 
  
¶k *
¶f
=
1
-(1- a)aA
r + d + f
aA
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
2-a
-(1-a )
< 0 
 
 
(8) 
 
If cross-border services trade barriers are reduced, and this leads to a reduction in 
financial service prices domestically, we then expect k* to rise as well. 
 Under the WTO, “trade” is actually defined as a mix of cross-border trade and 
local establishment (FDI) in the case of services.  We are therefore also interested in 
the case where foreign banks are allowed to enter the domestic market, where they 
then act like other banks in the local market.  For simplicity, we assume they are 
subject to local cost conditions in the pure FDI case.  This scenario effectively 
increases the size of n.  Assuming that n is allowed to increase (which may require 
adjustment of any regulatory target for p  set by the government), we then have the 
following effect related to entry of foreign banks from equation (6): 
  
¶k*
¶n
= n(r + d + c)
(n - (1- a))aA
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
1
-(1-a )
> 0 
 
 
(9) 
 
As in cross-border trade, local establishment can also be expected to have positive 
medium- and long-run effects related to the evolution of the capital stock. 
 What happens (as is often the case in developing countries) if the government 
sets a quantity limit for the foreign banking sector, leaving the rest of the domestic 
market to domestic firms?  If we define K  as the regulated size of the foreign banking 
sector, the  demand elasticity for the domestic sector is directly related to the size of 
the foreign banking enclave: 
  
˜ e*= e*
K *
K *-K 
 
 
(10) 
 
 
Note that K  may be set under our trade or FDI scenario. In either case, working 
through the rest of the system as defined above, market power is weakened by an 
expansion of K , implying lower prices and a higher value for k*. 
 Next, consider market size.  The reader can verify that, under constant returns 
(i.e. when c=0), the size of the market simply does not matter.  However, with scale 
economies in the banking sector, size plays a pro-competitive role, leading to entry 
and an increase in the overall capital stock k* in the steady-state.  If we differentiate 
the system defined by equations  (5), (6), and (7), we have the following: 
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¶n *
¶L d ,a,b,c,p ,r
=
c(n * -(1 - a ))2 n *
L[(1- a)b + (1- a)r + (1- a)d + (1 - a)Lk * +(n - (1 - a ))(n - (2 - a))c]
> 0 
(11) 
  
¶k *
¶L d ,a,b,c,p ,r
=
ck * (n - (1 - a))
L[(1- a)b + (1 - a )r + (1- a)d + (1- a)Lk * +(n - (1 - a ))(n - (2 - a))c ]
> 0 
 
(12) 
 
 
As is the case with industry studies, we can expect scale economies to imply a link 
between country size and pricing across a sample.  In the present context, this will be 
reflected by an indirect linkage between country size, concentration, and k*. 
  
C. Transition Dynamics 
The same mechanisms that link services trade in our model with long-run incomes 
also link financial sector openness with transitional or medium-term economic 
growth.  Consider, for example, a constant returns world initially characterized by a 
closed banking sector and oligopoly pricing.  Starting from the steady-state, prices are 
given by equation (7), and the steady-state levels of per-capita capital k* and 
consumption c* are then given by the two differential equation system: 
  
)]()('[0
)()(0
1 fdr
d
++-Q-==
--==
- kfc
ckkfk
&
&
 
 
(13) 
(14) 
 
where Q is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and f(.) is the Cobb-Douglas 
production function defined in equation (1).  From the c&  curve we can directly solve 
for the steady-state level of per-capita capital k*, and obviously, if we introduce trade 
in services, such that the price f is driven below its steady-state oligopoly value 
(recall the discussion of equation [8]), then we will have an increase in steady-state 
capital stocks.  The resulting transition path, with rising consumption (after an initial 
drop to seed the rise in the capital stock), and rising capital stocks k is shown in 
Figure 1.  In turn, the growth of the capital stock implies a process of medium-term 
transitional economic growth, as the new capital accumulated through equation [13], 
fed through equation [1] also then yields GDP growth.    
 
III. EMPIRICS 
Following our discussion in Section II, we have a number of candidate relationships 
for empirical testing. First of all we expect banking sectors in smaller countries to be 
more concentrated due to economies of scale  in the provision of financial services 
(equation 11). On top of that we want to test whether open financial systems tend to 
foster competition in the banking sector. More competition, i.e. less concentration in 
the banking sector, would then drive down market power as reflected in price. 
(equation 5).   The final link in this causal chain is between market power and 
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economic growth. As the financial sector becomes more efficient the model predicts 
higher rates of capital accumulation and a transition to a higher steady state capital 
stock per capita (equations 6, 8, 9,  13).   In short, we may expect higher growth rates 
in the transition, all other things being equal, for countries with more open financial 
systems and comparable income levels.  
We follow the approach of the recent empirical literature. This involves cross-
country growth regressions, wherein we include a number of variables that seem to 
perform robustly in the literature. To this mix of variables, we also add measures of 
financial sector openness and the degree of competition in the financial services 
sector.  Our data are drawn from a number of sources, and provide a set of indicators 
for 130 countries for the period 1990-1999, including most of the transition 
economies. (These data are available from the authors upon request.)  The variables 
we work with are summarized in Table 1.  We are ultimately interested in economic 
growth, for which we take the average growth rate for per-capita income for the 
period 1990-99.   Based on the literature, we also work with the standard deviation of 
inflation over this period (as an indicator of macroeconomic stability), the degree of 
trade openness (measured by the share of trade in GDP, and corrected for country size 
and income level), political stability, and a dummy for the transition economies. 
Initial per-capita GDP serves as an overall indicator of base period development.  
Country size is measured by GDP, and scaled by world GDP.  Population growth is 
also the average for the 1990-99 period.   
Finding general cross-country measures of the degree of competition in 
banking is problematic at best.  The measures we work with are rough: the share of 
domestic banking assets held by the three largest banks (effectively a proxy for 
concentration as developed in the previous section), an index of bank profitability, 
and a measure of bank markups (see CONCENT, PROFIT, and NIM in Table 1).  For 
financial sector openness we have four measures.  One is a crude estimate of tariff-
equivalents for financial services trade, based on GATS (General Agreement on Trade 
in Services) commitments within the WTO.  (For details see Hoekman 1995).  A 
second is the Heritage Foundation’s “Bank Freedom” index. More definition is 
provided under the headings TARREQ, BANKFREE, and FOREIGN in Table 1.  
 We estimate a simple simultaneous system of three equations.  The results are 
presented in Table 2. The results in Table 2 are based on the following system(s): 
  
CONCENTi = AX1,i + e1,i  
 
(15.1) 
 NIMi (or PROFITi) = BX2,i + e2,i (15.2) 
 PCGRi = CX3,i + e3,i  (15.3) 
 
The variables included in the right hand side of equations 15 are listed in Tables 2, 3, 
and 4.  Because we are interested in the linkages between growth, competition, and 
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openness, a system estimation approach makes sense.  We then have a number of 
estimation options available, including three-stage least squares and maximum 
likelihood. We want to avoid an estimation approach that requires a square dataset 
(i.e. if we are missing observations from one of the three equations, we drop that 
observation from all three equations).  Given the uneven coverage for some of our 
indicators (especially when we work with tariff-equivalent data), we are otherwise 
excluding information available from the full dataset.  In addition, our measures of 
bank markups are themselves rough, and we expect them to be prone to error as well 
(as implied by the structure of equation 15.2, where CONCENT appears on the right 
hand side, and equation 15.3, where NIM or PROFIT appears on the right hand side).  
This means we will have some correlation between right hand side variables and error 
terms, with transmission of error terms across equations. To handle this and filter the 
transmission of error terms, we use an approach similar to iterative three stage least 
squares.  Basically, where we have estimated values from elsewhere in the system, we 
substitute right hand side exogenous variables with the model estimates (or more 
formally the estimated means conditional on exogenous variables within the system) 
to then obtain least squares estimates.  Like instrument methods, this allows us to 
effectively sweep error terms transmitted from right hand side variables out of the 
regression equations above. Unlike those methods, we salvage information in 
observations dropped under some other approaches (and effectively assuming zero 
errors for these observations, which will be true on average in large samples) by 
leaving the actual observations of right-hand side endogenous variable in the 
regressions if they cannot be estimated elsewhere in the system.  To obtain parameter 
estimates, the entire system is then estimated simultaneously as a constrained 
minimization problem for the sum of the system squared errors in GAMS (a non-
linear programming language used for large-scale numerical problems). 4 The 
constrained minimization problem is      
 
min ei, j
2
i=1
3
å
j=1
n
å
s.t. 15.1,  15.2, 15.3
 
 
 
(16) 
 
We refer to these as “simultaneous error correction” or SEC-based estimators.  Note 
that without the replacement of right-hand side endogenous variables by system 
estimates, this simply collapses to ordinary least squares estimation. 
We are first interested in the relationship between financial sector openness 
and competition.  These estimates (equation 15.1) are presented in Table 2.  In 
equation 15.1, X1 includes SIZE and one of the openness indicators.  SIZE is included 
                                                                 
4 GAMS code is available from the authors upon request. Solutions to the problem of system estimation 
under such conditions can be traced to Theil (1953).  The present approach combines instrument 
variable strategies for non-linear system estimation with sparse information sets methods now being 
explored for large-scale general equilibrium system estimation (see Francois 2002). 
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because (see Section II) larger markets imply more scope for competition when scale 
economies are present. TARREQ, BANKFREE, and FOREIGN are included as our 
measures of financial sector openness.  The SIZE variable emerges as consistently 
significant at the .01 level.  Smaller economies are highly correlated with a greater 
degree of concentration.  Critical to the present exercise, our financial sector openness 
variables, TARREQ, BANKFREE, and FOREIGN, all emerge with coefficients that 
are significant at the .01 level as well.  We will examine the policy "significance" of 
these coefficients, in terms of the size of this effect, after we look at growth. 
 Consider next the link between market concentration and financial pricing 
(measured by NIM and PROFIT).  These are included in X2 above, and are reported in 
Table 3. They emerge, under all specifications, with significance at the .01 level.  Our 
parameter for financial crisis is less robust, typically being generally significant at the 
.05 or .10 level.   
Finally consider the growth results.  These are reported in Table 4. Generally, 
the standard cross-country growth variables emerge with significant coefficients in the 
.01 to .05 range.  Our measures of financial sector performance, NIM and PROFIT, all 
emerge with significant coefficients at the .010 level.  This estimated effect is highly 
robust to the model specification chosen (in terms of openness indicator).   
From the results for equations 15, we have identified the following pattern in 
the data.  Open financial sectors appear to be more competitive, leading ultimately to 
lower financial service prices and profits. Those regimes featuring more competitive 
financial sectors are in turn strongly linked with higher growth rates. Note also that 
this effect comes in addition to the effect of other financial variables, as is highlighted 
in the established literature. The coefficients of the standard growth regression 
variables including the dummy for transition economies all have the expected signs 
and generally emerge at high significance levels. 
 Finally we are interested in how strong  the effects are that we have identified.  
Within our sample, protection in the financial services sector (or identically closed 
financial sectors) is concentrated in the lower income countries.  This is illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3.  The OECD countries in the sample tend to have the most open 
financial service sectors, so that the question of gains from liberalization can also be 
viewed as one particularly relevant for developing countries.  Figures 2 and 3 present 
a striking picture of differences in financial openness mapping to differences in 
growth.  However, many of these differences also follow from other factors (hence 
the regressions above).  Consider our estimates for the BANKFREE and TARREQ 
openness indicators.  Working from these estimates, and holding all else constant, if a 
“typical” lower income countries were to move from the openness level 
characterizing the average lower income regime to the more liberal openness level 
characterizing the average higher income regime (i.e. a roughly 50% liberalization of 
financial services trade by these measures), our results suggest that this implies a 
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difference in growth rates of between roughly 0.4 and 0.6 percent.  In other words, 
based on the coefficients in Table 2, moving across our sample from the average level 
of openness among the developing countries in our sample to the average among the 
higher income countries is associated with an increased degree of competition in the 
financial services sector and in turn with growth rates that are then higher (in the 
range of 0.4 percent to 0.6 percent per year on a per capita basis).  This is in line with 
other recent estimates of financial development and growth linkages, though the 
mechanism is different, being grounded in market structure and competition.  
 
IV.   SUMMARY 
Recent empirical studies have applied both endogenous and bounded growth 
frameworks to assess the effect of financial service sector development on growth 
rates and per-capita income levels. In general, the approach involves employing 
financial sector development indicators as independent variables in growth 
regressions. Most of this literature has looked at indicators of banking sector 
development and the degree of private sector involvement in financial services and 
the allocation of savings, and at distortion and financial service cost measures.  In 
addition, a few studies have examined the relationship between stock-market 
development and growth.   
Along these lines, this paper examines the pro-competitive effects of trade in 
financial services.  We highlight the role of financial services at the nexus of the 
savings and accumulation mechanism that drives economic growth.  Following a brief 
review of the literature, we develop an analytical model in Section 2 characterized by 
Ramsey accumulation and an oligopolistic financial services sector.  This model is 
used to highlight channels through which financial services trade may lead to 
dynamic, pro-competitive effects.  This analytical exercise helps motivate the 
econometric exercise in Section III.  In cross-country regressions on data for 130 
countries in the 1990s, we find that there is a strong positive relationship between 
financial sector competition and financial sector openness, and between growth and 
financial sector competition.    
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Figure 1 
Trade and transition dynamics 
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Figure 2 
 
Foreign Banking Restrictions and Growth in the 1990s
(Bank Freedom Index as a Proxy for Restrictions on Foreign Banks)
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note:  Growth rates are per-capita, while banking sector openness is based on the banking freedom index.
High income countries (24 in total) have 1990 GDP per capital above US $10,000 ; medium income countries (32 total)
have incomes above US $2,500 US, lower middle income countries have incomes above US $1,000 per capita (27 in total)
and lower income countries constitute the remainer (43 countries).
Low bank restrictions have an index value of 1 to 2.33, medium ranges from 2.4 to 3.66,  and high ranges from 3.7 to 5.
The sample of high income countries with high banking restrictions includes only Greece.
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Figure 3 
 
Foreign Banking Restrictions and Growth in the 1990s
(Tarrif Equivalents as a Proxy for Restrictions on Foreign Banks)
High income countries (23 in total) have 1990 GDP per capital above US $10,000 ; medium income countries (32 total)
have incomes above US $2,500 US, lower middle income countries have incomes above US $1,000 per capita (27 in total)
and lower income countries constitute the remainer (43 countries).
Low to medium bank restrictions have a tariff equivalent index below 35. High ranges from 35 to 50.
The OECD countries with an index below 20 include Sweden, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Austria,
Australia, New Zealand, and Finland.
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Table 1: Overview of dataset 
 
1.A Macroeconomic indicators  
FINCRIS: 
Financial crisis indicator (based on economy -wide loan loss provisions over net interest revenue).  
 
INFLATE:  
The standard deviation of the inflation rate over the 1990-99 period. 
 
PCGDP90: 
Per-capita GDP in 1990.  
 
PCGDPGR:  
The average of per-capita growth over the 1990-99 period. 
 
POLSTAB: 
Political stability indicator from –2.5 to 2.5 (-2.5=most unstable, 2.5=most stable). 
 
POPGR:  
Average rate of population growth over the 1990-99 period.  
 
SIZE: 
Total value of GDP, averaged over 1990-99, and scaled by total value of world GDP. 
 
TRADE: 
Exports and imports as a share of GDP, averaged over the 1990-99 period. 
 
TRANSEC: 
Transition economy (1=yes, 0=no). 
 
1.B Financial Sector Indicators  
BANKFREE: 
Openness of banking sector in terms of restrictions on ability of foreign banks to open branches and 
subsidiaries, barriers to domestic bank formation, government influence over credit allocation, 
government ownership of banks, government regulations like deposit insurance, and restrictions on 
providing all kinds of financial services from 1 to 5 (1= very low restrictions, 5=very high restrictions). 
 
CONCENT:  
Concentration in the financial sector: the assets of the largest three banks as a share of total assets in 
percent (corrected for income by using only largest 100 banks' assets), averaged over 1990-99 period. 
 
FOREIGN: 
The share of the banking sector accounted for by foreign banks. 
 
NIM: 
Net interest income over total banking assets in percent, averaged over 1990-99 period. 
 
PROFIT: 
Commercial banks’ gross operating profits over total assets  in percent, averaged over 1990-99 period. 
 
TARREQ : 
Estimated tariff equivalent of trade protection of the domestic banking and financial services sector in 
percent as derived from WTO Members' GATS commitments in financial services (excluding 
insurance); ranges from 0 (free) to 50 (most protectionist).  Extended from the original set reported by 
Hoekman (1995) to include transition economies. 
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Datasources by variable: 
 
FINCRIS: Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) 
INFLATE: IMF World Economic Outlook  
PCGDP90: World Bank World Development Indicators 
PCGDPGR: IMF World Economic Outlook 
POLSTAB: World Bank Worldwide Governance Research Indicators Dataset 
POPGR: World Bank World Development Indicators 
SIZE: World Bank World Development Indicators 
TRADE: World Bank World Development Indicators 
BANKFREE: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
CONCENT: Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) 
FOREIGN: Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) 
NIM: Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) 
PROFIT: Bankscope (Bureau van Dijk) 
TARREQ: Hoekman 1995 
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Table 2. Banking concentration and financial openness: Dependent variable CONCENT 
System no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
SIZE  -2.702  
(0.584)*** 
 -3.277 
 (0.661)*** 
 -1.462  
(0.502)*** 
 -2.707  
(0.584)*** 
 -3.277  
(0.661)*** 
 -1.463  
(0.502)*** 
TARREQ      0.693  
(0.196)*** 
     0.692  
(0.196)*** 
FOREIGN    -1.202  
(0.310)*** 
     -1.200  
(0.310)*** 
  
BANKFREE  14.515  
(1.763)*** 
     14.508  
(1.763)*** 
    
TRANSEC  8.929  
(4.212)** 
 11.989  
(4.792)*** 
 16.567  
(5.395)*** 
 8.941  
(4.1212)** 
 11.999  
(4.792)*** 
 16.584  
(5.395)*** 
Number of observations 128 121 77 128 121 77 
R-squared 1/ 0.48 0.31 0.60 0.48 0.31 0.60 
              
* denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 10% level         
** denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 5% level           1/ R-squared is for error-corrected regressions.  Standard errors 
***denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 1% level           are based on model fit given original (uncorrected) data. 
 
Systems (1) – (3) dependent variable NIM, systems (4) – (6) dependent variable PROFIT 
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Table 3. Marketpower and banking concentration: Dependent variables NIM and  PROFIT 
System no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CONCENT  0.063  
(0.011)*** 
 0.046  
(0.011)*** 
 0.036  
(0.011)*** 
 0.027  
(0.006)*** 
 0.030  
(0.006)*** 
 0.021  
(0.006)*** 
FINCRIS  -0.019  
(0.010)** 
 -0.015  
(0.009)* 
 -0.014  
(0.009)* 
 -0.007  
(0.005)* 
 -0.008  
(0.005)* 
 -0.005       
(0.005)  
TRANSEC  2.525  
(0.760)*** 
 2.641     
(0.746)*** 
 2.729    
(0.744)*** 
 1.467  
(0.375)*** 
 1.386  
(0.378)*** 
 1.472   
(0.376)*** 
Number of observations 123 123 123 120 120 120 
R-squared 1/ 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.22 
              
* denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 10% level         
** denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 5% level           1/ R-squared is for error-corrected regressions.  Standard errors 
***denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 1% level           are based on model fit given original (uncorrected) data. 
 
Systems (1) – (3) dependent variable NIM, systems (4) – (6) dependent variable PROFIT 
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Table 4. Per-capita GDP growth and marketpower: Dependent variable PCGDPGR 
System no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
PCGDP90  -1.046E-04  
(3.309E-05)*** 
 -1.041E-04  
(3.548E-05)*** 
 -1.026E-04  
(3.737E-05)*** 
 -1.067E-04  
(3.459E-05)*** 
 -1.071E-04  
(3.358E-05)*** 
 -1.072E-04  
(3.838E-05)*** 
POPGR  -0.420  
(0.264)* 
 -0.424  
(0.283)** 
 -0.438  
(0.299)* 
 -0.312    
(0.286) 
 -0.309      
(0.278) 
 -0.308     
(0.318) 
TRADE  0.011    
(0.005)** 
 0.011    
(0.005)** 
 0.010    
(0.005)** 
 0.011    
(0.005)** 
 0.011    
(0.005)** 
 0.011      
(0.005)** 
INFLATE  -8.344E-04   (3.1007E-
04)** 
 -8.334E-04   (3.234E-
04)*** 
 -8.324E-04   (3.500E-
04)*** 
 -9.407E-04   (3.097E-
04)*** 
 -9.422E-04   (3.007E-
04)*** 
 -9.427E-04   (3.437E-
04)*** 
NIM  -0.469  
(0.102)*** 
 -0.623  
(0.109)*** 
 -0.714  
(0.115)*** 
      
PROFIT             -1.078    
(0.152)*** 
 -0.970  
(0.147)*** 
 -1.400  
(0.169)*** 
POLSTAB  1.235  
(0.370)*** 
 1.243     
(0.397)*** 
 1.268  
(0.418)*** 
 1.337  
(0.391)*** 
 1.330  
(0.380)*** 
 1.327  
(0.434)*** 
TRANSEC  -3.187  
(0.797)*** 
 -2.755    
(0.855)*** 
 -2.535  
(0.900)*** 
 -2.930  
(0.895)*** 
 -3.142  
(0.869)*** 
 -2.420  
(0.993)*** 
Number of observations115 115 115 112 112 112 
R-squared 1/ 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 
* denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 10% level 
     
** denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 5% level 
***denotes significant (given expectation on sign) at 1% level 
          1/ R-squared is for error-corrected regressions.  Standard errors  
          are based on model fit given original (uncorrected) data. 
  
 
